Harsha Kakar
Following the violent student-led protests that resulted in the ousting of Sheikh Hasina’s regime and the formation of the Yunus interim government, Bangladesh’s economy is on a downward trajectory, while violence against minorities continues to impact its relationship with India. Despite meetings between the Indian foreign secretary and his Bangladeshi counterpart, Touhid Hussain, as well as with interim government leader Mohamad Yunus, Bangladesh seems to be distancing itself from India and gravitating closer to Pakistan.
This year, for the first time in over fifty years, Vijay Diwas, which commemorates the victory over Pakistan and the liberation of Bangladesh, was observed in Kolkata with minimal participation from Bangladeshi Mukti Yoddhas. Additionally, the interim government in Bangladesh has annulled holidays associated with its founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, including those for his birth and death anniversaries.
Nahid Islam, a ‘student coordinator’ and adviser to the interim government, stated that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is not recognized as the Father of the Nation by the interim administration. This stance aligns with the violence that erupted against the Sheikh Hasina regime regarding reservations for families of freedom fighters from the 1971 war.
Many in Bangladesh view Jinnah as the key figure in the formation of the nation, rather than Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. For the first time since 1971, the death anniversary of Jinnah was observed in September. Numerous statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman have been destroyed. Reflecting a shift in its approach towards Pakistan, the Yunus government has dispensed with the requirement for Pakistani nationals visiting Bangladesh to secure security clearance prior to applying for a visa.
Mohamad Yunus also had a meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, during the UN General Assembly session in New York. In that meeting, Yunus urged India to revive SAARC, seemingly to appease Pakistan, which has regarded SAARC as ineffective.
After a hiatus of nearly six years, direct flights between the two nations have resumed. A Pakistani merchant ship docked in Bangladesh for the first time in fifty years in November. Furthermore, Bangladesh has expressed intentions to diversify its sugar imports from India to include Pakistan. The interim government also plans to broaden its import of various food products beyond India.
In another noteworthy development, Bangladesh has ordered artillery and tank ammunition from Pakistan. This order includes 40,000 rounds of artillery and 2,000 rounds of tank ammunition, far surpassing the previous years’ request of just 12,000 artillery rounds. Additionally, the interim government has retracted its decision to allow private telecom operators to use Bangladesh as a transit point for providing bandwidth to India’s North East.
A meeting of the Pakistan-Bangladesh Joint Economic Commission is imminent. As reported to Islamabad, the High Commissioner of Pakistan to Dhaka noted that the Yunus government is keen on strengthening ties with Pakistan. He remarked that political parties across the Bangladeshi spectrum view Pakistan positively. Pro-Pakistan factions within the Bangladeshi bureaucracy and military, alongside Jamaat-e-Islami, advocate for enhancing relations.
The two countries are set to grow closer, given the numerous commonalities between them. Both nations promote Islamization as a means to distract from economic failures, rising inflation, and unemployment. The Jamaat-e-Islami continues to be a significant political entity in both countries, sharing a similar ideology and leading much of the anti-minority demonstrations.
Both Bangladesh and Pakistan require support from international monetary institutions to stabilize their economies, which are struggling. Consequently, their governments often ignore the targeting of minorities, recognizing that the public needs an outlet for their frustrations. Despite assurances of state responsibility to secure minorities while requesting non-interference in domestic matters, little action has been taken to mitigate the escalating violence.
The military exerts considerable influence in both countries, with limited authority granted to governments tasked with daily governance. Throughout their histories, both nations have experienced military rule following coups. Their states are authoritarian, with compromised judiciaries, suppressed political opposition, and restrictive media environments.
In Pakistan, the entire state apparatus, including a compromised judiciary, is employed to dismantle the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led by Imran Khan, while a similar campaign is underway against Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League in Bangladesh. Interestingly, both authoritarian regimes receive support from the United States.
For both Pakistan and Bangladesh, India remains a neighboring country perceived as a significant threat due to its robust military capabilities. While India has shown no aggressive intentions, the fear of India as a dominating figure may cause both nations to forge closer ties. While Pakistan fears Indian ambitions regarding POK, Bangladeshis are concerned about India’s intentions to expand the Chicken’s Neck and to ensure the safety of Bangladeshi Hindus. Many Bangladeshis prefer to overlook India’s role in their 1971 liberation struggle.
As Pakistan has been implicated in fomenting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and supporting the Khalistan movement, it is plausible that Bangladesh will adopt similar strategies in the future. Insurgencies in the Northeast may gain traction within Bangladesh, exacerbating India’s security dilemmas. The ISI has historically operated freely in Bangladesh, providing training and resources to anti-India insurgent groups during military administrations and under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). This precedent may be resurrected.
Another common thread is China. Since the removal of the Sheikh Hasina regime, China has increased its engagement with Bangladesh. Recently, it invited senior members of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami for discussions in Beijing, aiming to strengthen relations. The coordinated efforts of pro-Pakistan and pro-China factions may pave the way for tighter Bangladesh-Pakistan relations, which poses a significant concern for India as it finds itself encircled by countries pursuing disruptive agendas.
The recent visit of the Indian foreign secretary to Dhaka underscored that India acknowledges the interim government and intends to continue its support for Bangladesh as before. It also emphasized the necessity for both nations to collaborate in overcoming mistrust while addressing their respective concerns. Nevertheless, the substantial economic and military strength of India contributes to a growing anti-India sentiment, compelling both Islamabad and Dhaka to seek closer ties. Rebuilding relations amid these challenges will be a significant task for the Ministry of External Affairs.
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