Harsha Kakar
Vikram Misri, the Indian foreign secretary, made a recent trip to Bangladesh that included meetings with his counterpart, Mohammad Touhid Hossain, and the head of the interim Government, Mohammad Yunus. According to the MEA readout, Misri emphasized India’s commitment to a democratic, stable, peaceful, progressive, and inclusive Bangladesh. He also expressed India’s concerns regarding the safety and well-being of minority communities, along with issues related to attacks on cultural, religious, and diplomatic properties.
However, the visit might have had underlying implications beyond its apparent agenda. It is probable that the Indian Prime Minister aimed to deliver a strong message indicating that the Mohammed Yunus Government’s treatment of minorities is unacceptable and that the increasing anti-India sentiment within the country requires addressing. Subsequent developments suggest that these concerns were clearly articulated.
Firstly, shortly after the visit, the interim Government in Bangladesh officially acknowledged 88 incidents of communal violence against minorities, predominantly targeting Hindus. A spokesperson noted that 70 individuals were apprehended in this context. Since then, there has been a notable decrease in coordinated assaults on minority groups.
Secondly, in what seems to be a preemptive strategy against potential Indian threats to reduce subsidized food supplies, Bangladesh declared its intent to diversify its imports. The country outlined plans to source onions, potatoes, and sugar from Pakistan, in addition to India.
Thirdly, the Arakan army of Myanmar, a Buddhist ethnic insurgency opposing the military junta, has established control over a 270 km stretch of the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. While this does not pose an immediate threat to Bangladesh, it has prompted an influx of Rohingyas into the country and has restricted the importation of rice from Myanmar, leaving India as the primary source for such provisions.
Historically, India and Bangladesh enjoyed close ties, resolving territorial disputes, thriving trade, and strong cultural exchanges, with India being a favored destination for shopping and medical treatment. However, the dynamics have shifted since the Sheikh Hasina regime was overthrown.
Anti-India sentiment has surged, accompanied by calls to boycott Indian products. Notably, Mahfuz Alam, a Government advisor and staunch Islamist, released a map incorrectly depicting West Bengal, Tripura, and Assam as part of Bangladesh, which was later deleted but resulted in diplomatic repercussions.
Moreover, Indian missions and cultural centers have faced attacks. On Vijay Diwas, Asif Nazrul, the law advisor to the interim Government, remarked that ‘India was merely an ally in this victory, nothing more,’ neglecting to acknowledge that the Pakistani army surrendered to Indian forces that led the operations, with no Bangladeshis present in the surrender photograph. Additionally, Bangladesh was not permitted to hold or try any Pakistani prisoners for war crimes.
In contrast, Vijay Diwas celebrations involving the armed forces on both sides were carried out in good faith and adhered to prior protocols, although attendance from Bangladeshi war veterans was notably low.
In India, there is growing outrage against the attacks on minorities in Bangladesh, evidenced by decisions in Tripura where hospitals, hotels, and restaurants have chosen not to host Bangladeshis. Nationwide protests against the violence targeting Hindus have also occurred.
Furthermore, Bangladesh has requested, through diplomatic channels, the extradition of Sheikh Hasina. It’s unlikely to be granted due to several factors, including loopholes in the treaty, but such requests will certainly influence diplomatic relations.
The deterioration of ties between these once close allies raises concerns, despite India’s cautious public criticism and preference for silent diplomacy while maintaining open communication lines. Bangladesh will still require Indian support, regardless of backing from China, the US, or Pakistan, which was evident when Yunus sought 50,000 tons of rice at discounted rates from India.
India must come to terms with the fact that the Sheikh Hasina governmental framework has collapsed, giving way to a very different Bangladesh that appears indifferent to India’s historical assistance in its quest for freedom and during its existence. The current Islamist leadership in Bangladesh seems to perpetuate the notion that India has meddled in their domestic affairs throughout history, portraying it not as a friend but as a potential adversary.
Consequently, future relations may involve increased tensions along the Indo-Bangladesh border. India’s principal concerns will include illegal immigration, support for NE terrorist factions, and heightened anti-India sentiment. Incidents of gunfire between border security forces may soon become commonplace as the BSF strives to combat smuggling and illegal immigration.
There is also a challenge posed by radicalized Bangladeshis residing illegally in India, which can significantly impact national security. Recently, Indian security agencies apprehended members of the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), a global terrorist group operating sleeper cells within India, with plans targeting the Siliguri corridor. Security forces also detained members of LeT attempting to flee to Bangladesh.
There are unverified reports suggesting that Pakistan is facilitating the transit of terrorists to Jammu and Kashmir via Bangladesh. The lifting of security clearance requirements for Pakistanis wishing to apply for a visa into Bangladesh raises concerns about an increased ISI presence and greater anti-India activities in Northeast India. The porous Indo-Bangladesh border, despite efforts to secure it through fencing, remains a critical issue.
India faces the prospect of managing two unstable borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh. While infiltration from Pakistan is predominantly by terrorists, there is an enhanced possibility of terrorists, Rohingyas, and other desperate individuals from Bangladesh crossing the 4000-plus km porous border. Both nations will continue to harbor anti-India sentiments, which may serve to draw them closer together.
Although Bangladesh will seek support and assistance from India, Pakistan, aware of the impossibility of relying on India, will likely collaborate with Bangladesh on a unified anti-India strategy, evident in the ongoing calls to resurrect SAARC. Bangladesh, unlike Pakistan, must navigate its relationship with India meticulously, as it remains reliant on India for most of its necessities, including electricity and food supplies.
China, which has already cultivated influences in Pakistan, will likely attempt similar outreach in Bangladesh. While India has effectively ignored Pakistan, perceiving it as a diminished influence, it will continue to strive for positive relations with Dhaka, hoping for a shift in attitude. The US deep state’s role in instigating changes in Bangladesh has inadvertently positioned India in an increasingly precarious situation, surrounded by three hostile nations. Navigating this landscape will be a significant challenge for the Indian Government.
The author is Major General (Retd)
