By Sean T. Byrnes
No matter the criticisms of Jimmy Carter’s presidency, it was evident that he aimed for profound change. From his understated inauguration in 1977—where he bypassed the traditional motorcade and black-tie events in favor of business attire and a relaxed walk down Pennsylvania Avenue—he pledged to improve American energy independence, reform welfare, and move beyond the “inordinate fear of communism” that had overshadowed US foreign policy since the 1940s. The thirty-ninth president took on numerous ambitious goals.
Coming into office in the aftermath of the disastrous Vietnam War and amidst significant racial tensions and economic woes, Carter aspired, as he expressed in his inaugural speech, to “revive a steadfast commitment to . . . fundamental [moral] principles” and to create a government that was “both capable and compassionate.”
While Carter accomplished more than he’s often credited for and is remembered as one of the more honorable individuals to hold the presidency, he ultimately did not achieve the sweeping transformation he envisioned. Instead, his presidency set a troubling precedent: Democratic leaders with noble and ambitious policy proposals stifled by a failure to build lasting coalitions or address the decline of their party’s appeal among working and middle-class constituents.
Born in Plains, Georgia, in October 1924, Carter initially appeared destined for a naval career, graduating from the Naval Academy in 1946 and serving on submarines until 1953. A family crisis called him back to Plains that year—his father had passed away, leaving the family farm in dire condition—reluctantly pushing Jimmy (with his even more hesitant wife, Rosalynn) to take the reins.
The call to public service was never far from him, and with the economy improving by the late 1950s, Carter ventured into politics, serving in the Georgia State Senate before an unsuccessful bid for governor in 1966 (he was narrowly defeated by the staunch segregationist Lester Maddox). While Carter had personal convictions against racism that were uncommon among Georgians of his background, he adeptly navigated political landscapes to appeal to white supremacists during his second gubernatorial campaign in 1970, which likely played a crucial role in his eventual success.
Once in office, Carter embraced his anti-racist roots, publicly denouncing segregation, promoting African American representation within Georgia’s government, and ensuring equitable funding for minority school districts. Many view his bureaucratic reforms as the hallmark of his governorship, indicative of his commitment to government efficiency—an ethos he would carry into his presidency. In many respects, he represented a post–civil rights revival of the “good government” ethos long associated with Progressive Democrats like Woodrow Wilson.
Although he served only a single term as governor, Carter pursued the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976. No longer catering to segregationists, he again sought to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters. The New York Times reported that both conservative and liberal voters identified with him—an approach his campaign strategists later acknowledged was intentional.
This strategy, while not as deceitful as the practices of some of his recent predecessors, effectively allowed Carter to maneuver through a fractured political landscape. The contentious debates surrounding the Vietnam War, civil rights, and racial justice had splintered the political coalitions that emerged in the 1930s and 1940s, leaving both major parties fractured between conservative and liberal factions.
The consensus supporting the New Deal’s center-left economic principles and the aggressive foreign policies of the Cold War was beginning to disintegrate, leading to uncertainty about the future political landscape. Carter adeptly navigated these challenges, appealing to enough factions within his party to win the nomination, while his Republican opponents engaged in a protracted internal battle. The near-success of Ronald Reagan in dethroning then-incumbent Gerald Ford made for a smoother path for Carter in the general election. However, given the significant political baggage Ford carried, Carter’s narrow win (he barely secured the popular vote) warranted concern.
Carter moved forward with determination. Deeply rooted in his Baptist faith and his worldview, he took bold steps to overcome what he perceived as the amoral power politics that had characterized US policy in preceding decades. The aftermath of the Vietnam War, the revelations of the CIA’s transgressions unveiled during congressional investigations in 1975, and the persistent threat of nuclear conflict prompted him to return to what he believed were the nation’s moral foundations: a robust commitment to “human rights.” As he stated in a 1977 speech at the University of Notre Dame, “America’s commitment to human rights” would form “a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.”
Though human rights served as a significant rhetorical pivot, they represented a broader, more complex goal to redefine American foreign policy. Influenced by thinkers such as his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who worried the mid-1970s saw a decline in US influence globally, Carter sought to restore America’s damaged global reputation by addressing worldwide concerns that previous administrations had purportedly ignored.
He began by rejecting the hard-line Cold War approaches that led to US involvement in Vietnam, signaling a shift towards accommodation and arms control with the Soviet Union. He also took a more conciliatory stance toward the Global South’s calls for enhanced international economic equity, notably by appointing civil rights icon Andrew Young as US ambassador to the UN. Moreover, his administration made significant strides (though not comprehensive) in combating white supremacy in Southern Africa, helping to dismantle minority rule in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Additionally, Carter was instrumental in negotiating what seemed to be a pivotal agreement for peace between Israel and Palestine: the Camp David Accords of 1978.
Perhaps his most lasting and currently underappreciated achievement was securing Senate approval for treaties that returned control of the Panama Canal Zone and the canal itself to Panama. By the mid-1970s, US oversight of the canal had diminished in strategic importance, while it remained a source of embarrassment internationally and a flashpoint for unrest in Panama. Previous administrations had tried to relinquish control, but fierce opposition to “giving away” the canal had stalled progress (opposing negotiations became a key component of Reagan’s campaign against Ford). Carter managed to see this through, obtaining ratification by a narrow margin, at the cost of considerable political capital.
Carter had an unfortunate tendency to deplete his political capital without a clear strategy to replenish it. His detail-oriented approach to policy and his principled yet often confrontational refusal to engage in the traditional horse-trading common in Congress hampered his ability to push forward his administration’s agenda as his term progressed.
More critically, he provided little in terms of domestic policy to win over voters struggling in the turbulent economic conditions of the mid-1970s. While this was undoubtedly a challenging environment for decision-makers, Carter’s inclination toward efficiency and cost-cutting increasingly aligned him with “small government” principles. The neoliberal shift away from the social democratic aspects of the New Deal—and toward the market fundamentalism that we see today—began during Carter’s administration.
Initial hopes that his administration would bolster the rights of labor and the economically disadvantaged gradually faded as President Carter’s focus shifted and his preference for conservative solutions became apparent. For instance, staff from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare proposed reviving a nearly passed guaranteed national income program from Nixon’s term. Instead, Carter advocated for more moderate initiatives, resulting in the 1977 welfare “Program for Better Jobs and Income,” which focused on cost-cutting rather than benefit increases.
A similar fate befell proposed legislation mandating the government to guarantee a job for all Americans, regardless of market conditions—an idea championed by pro-labor advocates since the 1940s. Initially proposed in 1974 by Senator Hubert Humphrey and Representative Augustus Hawkins, the bill required the government to provide employment if the market failed to do so. Yet, Carter seemed skeptical and instead pushed for a diluted proposal in 1977. Ultimately, the 1978 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act merely encouraged government efforts toward full employment, resulting in little more than an increase in the frequency of economic reports from the federal government.
The issues Carter chose to prioritize also failed to provide immediate relief for voters. His Energy Security Act and deregulation of fossil fuel prices likely contributed to a decrease in energy costs (thereby impacting inflation) in the long run; however, it remains debatable how much this truly aided working- and middle-class Americans, similar to the deregulation of the airline, trucking, and rail industries.
Lacking a comprehensive strategy to address economic inequality, these measures were perceived by many as mere tinkering on a sinking ship. In a more troubling light, in 1978, Carter enacted emergency provisions of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act to break a strike by the United Mine Workers. Fearing that the prolonged strike might lead to price hikes, Carter aligned himself with management, delivering one of the initial blows to organized labor’s power that would extend over the following decades.
Consequently, when the 1979 Iranian Revolution disrupted the global oil market—triggering rising prices, fuel shortages, and rekindled inflation—Carter was ill-equipped to alleviate the turmoil. One of his responses, the appointment of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve, resulted in more immediate hardship. Empowered to combat inflation, Volcker drastically raised interest rates throughout 1979 and 1980, which incited a cruel recession. By the time Volcker’s term ended (after Carter left office), inflation had receded, but wage growth had also declined, a reality that has persisted.
The upheaval in Iran and the subsequent hostage crisis—where student radicals stormed the US embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-six American hostages and holding most for over a year—fatally damaged whatever foreign policy reputation Carter had cultivated. His rational attempts at diplomacy were perceived by many Americans as humiliating, a sentiment exacerbated by a failed rescue mission that resulted in two US aircraft downed in the Iranian desert. Additionally, his efforts to ease Cold War tensions were further undermined by the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Overall, when the 1980 election season commenced, Carter faced a daunting challenge against Ronald Reagan and his politically damaging query to voters: “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” The answer, painfully clear, was no. Carter lost by a significant margin.
Reagan would go on to drastically diminish the power of working and middle-class Americans, paving the way for decades marked by stagnant incomes, dwindling labor unions, and soaring inequality. Yet, considering how little Carter himself contributed to reversing this trend, it is unsurprising that voters, particularly working-class “Reagan Democrats,” were willing to entrust the Republican with their support. As Stuart Hall described regarding Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party, Reagan’s success stemmed not merely from his “capacity to dupe unsuspecting folks” but also from his ability to “address real issues, real and lived experiences … within the framework of policies aligned with the right.” Carter’s solutions-oriented politics—devoid of substantial attempts to improve voters’ economic circumstances through income redistribution—failed to compete.
All of Carter’s Democratic successors in the Oval Office have fallen victim to similar pitfalls. Thus, while Carter’s presidency was indeed transformational, it was not in the manner he intended. Progressives seeking to escape the cycle established by Carter should draw inspiration not from his time in office, but from his post-presidency: a commendable, persistent commitment to enhancing the lives of those suffering from deprivation, illness, and poverty. A president dedicated to such an agenda could be truly transformative. (IPA Service)
