New Delhi, Mar 4: The Supreme Court has ruled that the use of terms such as “miyan-tiyan” and “Pakistani” does not constitute an offense of hurting religious sentiments, despite being in poor taste.
A bench comprising Justices B V Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma discharged a man involved in a criminal case brought by an Urdu translator and acting clerk from the Right to Information (RTI) office in Chas, Jharkhand.
In its order dated February 11, the court stated, “The appellant is accused of offending the informant’s religious feelings by using terms like ‘miyan-tiyan’ and ‘Pakistani.’ Although these remarks are indeed in poor taste, they do not amount to an infringement of the informant’s religious sentiments. Therefore, we believe the appellant should be discharged under Section 298 IPC.” This section pertains to deliberately using words or gestures to wound religious feelings.
The records indicated that accused Hari Nandan Singh had sought information under the RTI Act from the additional collector and first appellate authority in Bokaro, which was subsequently provided.
However, he later filed an appeal, claiming manipulation of the documents he received, making false allegations in the process.
The appellate authority instructed the translator to personally deliver the information to Singh.
On November 18, 2020, the informant, accompanied by a representative from the sub-divisional office in Chas, visited Singh’s residence to deliver the information.
Initially, Singh refused to accept the documents but ultimately took them after insistence from the informant.
It was alleged that Singh verbally abused the informant based on his faith and employed criminal force against him, prompting the translator to file an FIR.
An investigation led to the trial court framing charges against Singh under Sections 353 (assault or criminal force against a public servant) and 504 (intentional insult) of the IPC.
The Jharkhand High Court dismissed Singh’s request to quash these proceedings.
Upon reviewing his plea against the high court’s decision, the bench discharged him from the charge of intentional insult, noting there was “no act on his part that could have provoked a breach of peace,” aside from the charge under Section 353.
“We nullify the high court’s decision that upheld the trial court order and grant the appellant’s application, thereby discharging him from all three alleged offenses,” the court added. (Agencies)
